Drayton v. Kyler by unknown
2007 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-7-2007 
Drayton v. Kyler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 
Recommended Citation 
"Drayton v. Kyler" (2007). 2007 Decisions. 984. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/984 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
ALD-239 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-5133
________________
JAMES E. DRAYTON,
               Appellant
   v.
SUPERINTENDENT KENNETH KYLER;
LT. SMITH, Supervisor of Restricted Housing Unit
at SCI-Huntingdon; LT. HARRIS, Supervisor of Restricted Housing
Unit at SCI-Huntingdon; JAMES GRACE, Deputy Superintendent;
A. SCOTT WILLIAMSON, Deputy Superintendent; DR. JOHN SYMONS,
Medical Director; PATRICIA YARGER, Health Care Administrator
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-00077)
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 24, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES AND GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed June 7, 2007)
2_______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
James E. Drayton, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order of
November 17, 2006, denying his motions to reopen, for sanctions, and for leave to file a
supplemental complaint.  For the reasons set forth herein, we will summarily affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
Appellant initiated this civil rights action in January 2002, alleging, among other
things, that Appellees violated his Eighth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
denying him access to his orthopedic boot while he was confined in the Restricted
Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI-Huntingdon between December 17, 2001 and February 11,
2002.  The action was plagued by discovery disputes and failed settlement attempts for
nearly four years.  On November 28, 2005, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania held a conference to determine the status of settlement
negotiations, consider Appellant’s motion for sanctions, and discuss trial and scheduling-
related matters.  During the course of the conference, in response to an inquiry regarding
the status of settlement negotiations, the Court determined that both parties were open to
settlement.  At Appellant’s request, the Court held private settlement discussions with
each side and then afforded the parties an opportunity to negotiate with one another.  By
the conclusion of the proceedings, the parties reached a settlement.  After hearing the
3terms on the record and confirming that Appellant understood them, the Court issued an
order indicating that the action had been settled, and dismissing it “without prejudice to
the right of either party, upon good cause shown, to reinstate the action within sixty (60)
days if the settlement is not consummated.”  
On June 1, 2006, well beyond the sixty-day limit, Appellant filed a “motion for
relief from proceeding of November 28, 2005,” requesting that the Court set aside the
settlement and reinstate the action pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  Additionally, Appellant filed a motion for sanctions and a motion for leave to
file a third amended complaint.  Meanwhile, Appellees filed a motion to enforce the
settlement reached on November 28.
The District Court first addressed Appellees’ motion, concluding that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, in light of its order of dismissal,
which failed to specifically retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement beyond the
specified sixty-day period.  See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of
America, 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994) (holding that federal district court lacks jurisdiction to
enforce terms of settlement agreement after underlying action has been dismissed unless
court specifically retains jurisdiction to do so); see also Shaffer v. GTE North, Inc., 284
F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2002); Phar-Mor Secs. Litig., 172 F.3d 270, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1999). 
    Rule 60(b) provides for relief from a judgment or order based on (1) mistake,1
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud,
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) a void judgment; (5) the
satisfaction, release or discharge of a judgment or inequity in the prospective application
of the judgment; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment.
4
The Court then turned to Appellant’s motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3).  1
Appellant alleged that he was unfairly surprised when the Court held settlement
discussions during what he believed would only be a hearing on his motion for sanctions. 
He claimed that he had received outstanding discovery responses from Appellees only a
few days before the hearing and was not provided with access to the law library, and
therefore was unable to adequately protect his rights during the settlement discussions. 
He further claimed that Appellees had engaged in fraud and misconduct by failing to
timely comply with discovery orders and by intentionally misleading Appellant with their
discovery responses.  Specifically, Appellant alleged that despite identifying “Policy
Number 6.5.1” as the basis for Appellees’ confiscation of his orthopedic boots upon his
admission to the RHU, Appellees failed to provide Appellant or the Court with a copy of
this policy, and actually misrepresented that such confiscation was mandatory rather than
discretionary under the policy.  Appellant maintained that he had relied on Appellees’
representations regarding the mandatory nature of the policy in accepting their offer of
settlement.  Finally, he claimed that Appellees drugged his food on the day of the
November 28 hearing, thereby rendering him unable to sufficiently represent himself
during the course of settlement negotiations.
5The District Court concluded that Appellant’s alleged bases for reopening the
lawsuit were without merit.  With respect to his unfair surprise argument, the Court
explained that it had made it clear to Appellant during the November 28 proceedings that
he did not have to participate in settlement discussions, and that the Court would not have
proceeded absent Appellant’s explicit agreement to do so.  As for Appellant’s claims
regarding fraud and misconduct by Appellees, the Court referred to numerous statements
by Appellant on the record indicating that he was aware, prior to the settlement
discussions of November 28, that the confiscation of orthopedic boots upon entry to the
RHU was discretionary, rather than mandatory.  In light of the fact that Appellant was
aware of the nature of the prison’s policy at the time of the hearing, the Court held that
Appellant could not have justifiably relied on such an alleged misrepresentation in
agreeing to settle his claims, and therefore rejected Appellant’s argument that the action
should be reopened on that basis.  Finally, the Court rejected Appellant’s claim of being
drugged as incredible, noting that it did not find Appellant to have been ill or under the
influence of a foreign substance during the course of the hearing.
In addition, the Court held that Appellant had inexcusably delayed in filing his
motion for relief.  See Harvey v. Continental Prods. Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 255 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding that even submissions filed within the one-year time frame of Rule 60(b)
must be filed within a reasonable time).  Appellant claimed that his delay in filing the
motion was attributable to the fact that he never received a copy of the Court’s sixty-day
6order.  However, Appellant was present when the Court announced that it was dismissing
the action based on the parties’ agreement to settle, and that it would enter a sixty-day
order permitting the parties to reopen the action within sixty days “if there’s a failure to
comply with any provision on either side.”  Accordingly, the Court concluded that
Appellant’s claim that he lacked notice of the order was both unpersuasive and
unavailing.
In light of its disposition of Appellees’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement
and Appellant’s motion to reopen the proceedings, the Court denied Appellant’s motions
for sanctions and for leave to file a third amended complaint as moot.  
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because this
appeal presents no “substantial question,” we will summarily affirm the judgment of the
District Court for all of the reasons set forth in the District Court’s well-reasoned opinion. 
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 & I.O.P. 10.6.
